Five Views on Apologetics

Five Views on Apologetics, edited by Steven B. Cowan, is not a book on apologetics, per se, but rather on the method of doing apologetics. The five contributors each express their own methodology and then interact with the other methodologies, critiquing, discerning differences and affirming agreements between the systems. There certainly are quite a number of differences; but amazingly, and I think even the authors showed some surprise, there is a great deal of agreement. After all, each of the contributors seek to honor God, are committed to the truth of Scripture and see apologetics as not only worthwhile, but commanded and necessary. So while the goal is the same, to a degree, this work is mostly about the differences between these systems. These five do not exhaust the list of apologetic methodologies, as Cowan points out, but represent five of the most popular systems.

The first system is that of Classical Apologetics. It is represented by William Lane Craig who is probably the best known of the group (at least in the arena of apologetics). Craig’s style sometimes trumps his method. He’s a straight-shooter, one who doesn’t waste time with pleasantries, but goes right to the issues. It might be difficult for the reader to get past this at times, especially when contrasted against others who seasoned their efforts with more graciousness. But Craig’s arguments are undergirded by his own experiences, making his words more compelling because the thoughts are grounded in reality. My response to this book will be around the Classical position. It is from that position that I have been mostly trained, and it is that position that I am still committed to (although the book certainly shook my thoughts).

Classical Apologetics makes a distinction between knowing and showing. Craig states, “rational arguments and evidence plays an essential role in our showing Christianity to be true, whereas reason in this form plays a contingent and secondary role in our personally knowing Christianity to be true.”  The classical apologist holds that personally knowing is the result of the Holy Spirit’s work, inwardly. It is also the work of the Spirit to open the hearts of those we are showing, or telling. His work is not simply to shore up our weaknesses (where we doubt in our knowing or make weak arguments in our showing), but precedes our work making it possible for us or our hearer to believe.  The Spirit’s work is then, according to Craig, self authenticated.  But the role of evidence and reason is not thrown out by the classicist. Craig mentions Luther’s differentiating between the magisterial and ministerial use of reason. While the magisterial use places reason over the Gospel, judging it, the ministerial use places reason in submission and service to the Gospel.  The latter is the position of the classical apologist. Craig shows this in his kalam cosmological argument. He holds that the belief of “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is “so perspicuous that only an effete skepticism can deny it.” While the atheist might say, “I don’t perceive God, therefore he does not exist,” Craig might respond, “you exist, you had a beginning, therefore Something caused it.” The atheist would have to deny the cause, showing his reason (“I don’t perceive God”) should not stand over the Gospel because it leads him to a false understanding of reality (“I must create an explanation for the cause of all these effects I see.”). Rather, reason should accompany the Gospel; specifically, the Bible makes a compelling case that God is the first cause.

In response to Evidential Apologetics, Craig dispels arguments for historical evidence alone, although the evidentialist, at least in this text, does not do so.   This is not to say that the classicist would oppose use of evidences. Rather, evidences bring the hearer (or the person being “shown,” to use the classical term) closer to a Christian form of theism. But as Gary Habermas, the Evidential Apologist, writes in response to the Classical position, Craig “does not distinguish his method carefully enough,” referring to getting to Christian theism by arguing from historical evidences.  I agree and think that other Classical apologists have done a better job at showing Christian theism apart from historical evidence. While the Classicist would concede that historical evidences bring the hearer closer to Christian theism, Habermas argues that they are “the best means of deciding between the theistic systems of belief.”  This may seem like a fine line, which presuppositionalist John Frame would argue,  but it is distinction enough the separate these two methodologies.

When responding to Cumulative Case Apologetics, Craig’s tone lowers dramatically (due probably to the fact that Paul Feinberg was a former teacher of his ). The differences between these two systems do not seem as great. The Classical Apologist simply puts more weight on the role of the Holy Spirit, where Feinberg views this as being too subjective. Where Feinberg believes Christianity is the best “cumulative case,” Craig argues that he “never gets his hands dirty by showing us how Christianity” is the best case in light of tests for truth. If he did, Craig asserts, he would be undertaking the same mission of the Classical Apologist.  The Cumulative Case is attractive; but it isn’t flawless. Kelly James Clark, the Reformed Epistemologist, is quick to point that out in his response by challenging Feinberg’s assumption that there is only one rational conclusion one can come to when presented with the evidence. If the rational unbeliever fails to accept the Resurrection based on the whole evidence, does that make the believer irrational? What Feinberg omits in this thought process, and Clark points this out, is the work of the Holy Spirit.  First Corinthians 2:14 tells us, “A natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit.” We are told that spiritual things are foolish to him. So even if he is rational, and a flawless cumulative case is made to him, apart from the work of the Holy Spirit, the rational, natural man will not accept it.

The Classical and Presuppositional methods have been in my mind the most at odds, before reading this book. Craig’s response to Frame’s presuppositional position certainly affirms that in many ways. Craig asserts that Frame abandons Presuppositionalism in his ‘Sketch of an Apologetic.’ And when he does “make a pretense of presupposing God’s existence…he has, like the classical apologist, already given arguments for the truth of theism.”  This, to me, is clearly a fair critique of Frame’s chapter. Craig finishes his critique by urging Reformed theologians to consider Reformed Epistemology over Presuppositionalism.   This struck me as particularly interesting in that the three most accepted methodologies within Reformed circles, to my knowledge, have been Classical, Presuppositional, and Reformed Epistemology. Craig, not being Reformed, ends up pitting the third over the second rather than the first (his own position), unnecessarily, in my opinion. Although Frame did not lead me into his camp, I found his writing compelling and inviting, not to mention especially sharp. He argues that faith is to guide reason. So for the unbeliever, the opposite (unbelief) distorts his rationality.  He writes, “When someone recognizes the truth but seeks to repress it, the result is irrationality.”  Then how does the unbeliever ever get to faith? The Holy Spirit of course,  which I believe affirms the Classical position. Habermas provides quite a bit of critique toward Presuppositionalism. He contends that the evidences and arguments themselves are not important to the Presuppositionalists because of the absence of such in their writings. Thus, this system is “incomplete” and “fails in the most important aspect” to provide “positive reasons to believe.”  

Reformed Epistemology holds that argument and evidence are not necessary for a person to believe in God. Clark writes, “The demand for evidence simply cannot be met in a large number of cases with the cognitive equipment we possess.”  There is much that we accept by faith. Had I not read Craig’s chapter on the Classical position first I would have been surprised by how much Clark seems to agree with Craig. My experience with Classical Apologetics differs some from what Craig accounts for. This, Clark calls hyper-classical apologetics, and refers to Sproul and Gerstner. I think Clark’s affirmation of Craig’s chapter helps bring the Classical methodology back into balance. Where the hyper-classical approach makes demands for evidence, Craig’s approach lines up more with Clark’s Reformed Epistemology, accepting that much of what we “know” is by faith (in something or someone). So Clark rejects the magisterial use of reason, agreeing with Craig’s affirmation of the ministerial use of reason.   Clark clarifies that reason can be grounds for belief in God, but they do not necessarily need to be. A sensible person could reject the arguments and remain rational. Furthermore, he asserts that there is no attempt to prove the existence of God in the Bible, but rather that it is assumed everywhere.  Craig agrees with Clark that theistic beliefs do not necessitate proof to be rational, and that arguments for God do present some evidence of His reality. But the Classical approach differs in that the testimony for the existence of God is not completely inward. God has revealed Himself outwardly, through creation, through His Word, and especially in His Son. 

After reading this work I remain in the Classical camp. Although there are points at which I disagree with Craig, I think this system represents the best methodology. I enjoyed Frame’s writing. I appreciated the grace of Habermas, Feinberg’s holistic viewpoint, and Clark’s Reformed position. In particular, Clark’s point that it is difficult to use Scripture to argue one’s methodology as the biblical approach, resonated with me. But at the end of the day, I stand on two facets of the Classical approach: 1) that the Holy Spirit is the necessary component to faith, and could potentially work apart from any argument or evidence, and 2) that because we have been commanded to be prepared to give a reason for the hope within, we should be prepared with good evidence and arguments for our faith.